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Abstract: The moral status of economic liberty is a critical point of contention within 
liberal theory. Classical liberals, including Tomasi, suggest that economic activity is 
fundamental for exercising personal autonomy and its protection to be to the overall 
benefit of all persons. By contrast, egalitarian liberals, following Rawls, argue that 
economic activity is not a sufficiently significant site of moral development. Drawing on 
contemporary interpretations of Adam Smith, I argue that commercial practices cultivate 
attitudes of mutual trust and respect in a way that is unique and necessary for developing 
the moral powers. Although they need not be universally exercised, basic economic 
liberties must be available to all. While rejecting laissez-faire, this case suggests that 
well-ordered societies must protect a substantial degree of commercial activity as part of 
the basic structure. 
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Are liberties to own productive property and engage in voluntary exchange basic in 
Rawlsian terms? This is a key controversy between classical liberals, such as Gaus (2010) and 
Tomasi (2012a) who affirm economic liberty to be essential rights within a public justificatory 
framework, and egalitarian liberals such as Freeman (2001), Rawls (1975; 1999) and Stilz 
(2014), who do not. So far, proponents have relied on the wealth-generating properties of 
markets and the supposed greater personal autonomy that economic freedom permits. These 
arguments have not convinced Rawlsians who suggest they do not show how economic liberty is 
necessary for developing citizens’ moral powers. This article attempts to reconcile what Hardin 
(2003, 41) identifies as two distinct traditions that have so far resisted combination: political 
liberalism and economic liberalism. 
My point of departure is that both sides in this debate currently rely on a shared 
neoclassical conception of economic activity. In doing so, they miss some insights from the 
classical political economy tradition that suggest that commerce exerts a critical influence on the 
moral character of society (Hirschman 1982). Although cognizant of the vices associated with 
business as well, scholars in this tradition recognize the often morally improving character of 
commercial institutions. Montesquieu (1777, XX.2) claims that commerce encourages peace and 
curbs prejudice between nations. Domestic commercial norms are a more mixed blessing, 
encouraging a sense of exact justice, that is norms against predation but also against support and 
sympathy among friends. Hume (1994a) believes there to be an unbreakable link between 
‘industry, knowledge, and humanity’ and argues that commerce among diverse nations can make 
everyone industrious and prosperous through mutual gains (1994b). Kant (1795, 149) describes 
commerce as how ‘peoples would be at first brought into peaceful relation with one another, and 
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so come to an understanding and the enjoyment of friendly intercourse, even with their most 
distant neighbours.’ 
In this article, I focus on reconciling Adam Smith (1981; 1982), who makes an important 
contribution to this moral tradition, with Rawls. Rawls (1999, 161) uses a proto-utilitarian 
representation of Hume and Smith as a foil for his contractarian account of justice as fairness.  
Contemporary scholars, including Schliesser (2017), McCloskey (2007) and Paganelli (2017; 
2010), have recovered a more socially oriented interpretation of Smith that suggest he was more 
than a proto-utilitarian when it came to the social role of economic activity, making this an 
opportunity to address Rawls’ characterization. Smith is a useful exponent in this context 
because of his greater optimism about the possibility of respecting social equality between 
persons compared to Hume (Levy and Peart 2004; Debes 2012). It is timely to explore these 
ideas as part of the discussion of basic institutions in a way that aligns with Rawls’ method of 
‘wide reflective equilibrium’ where theoretical principles and moral judgements are refined with 
the support of background social theories (Daniels 1979). 
With the recovery of this classical economic tradition in mind, I argue for considering 
economic liberties to be basic because of the unique role that commerce plays in developing 
citizens’ sense of justice which requires them to view one another as equals with their separate 
ends and yet capable of engaging in beneficial mutual cooperation. Rawls associates economic 
liberty with more narrowly expedient concerns with efficiency and material welfare. A classical 
political economy account suggests that engaging in commerce induces creative thinking and 
critical reflection about one’s reasoning and ends, as well as the ends and reasoning of others. I 
show how this commercial activity requires thick basic economic liberties. I argue that 
democratically constituted firms and public sector organizations contribute to economic 
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cooperation. However, they cannot replace private enterprise as various socialist proposals 
suggest without the state exercising direct control over firm membership in a way that prevents 
citizens from gaining experience of governance under voluntary conditions. In the concluding, 
section I explain how the Rawlsian approach to protecting basic liberties, in general, can help 
establish what legitimate regulation of economic liberty could look like. 
This argument has different normative implications to some existing accounts of basic 
economic liberties. Tomasi (2012b, 33) affirms a thick conception of economic liberty as part of 
his preferred regime of market democracy, and further associates it with the individualist 
orientation of the United States. By contrast, egalitarian liberals see the United States as 
deviating substantially from any plausible notion of justice as fairness. They endorse Rawls’ 
proposed theoretical alternatives to capitalism, liberal socialism and property-owning democracy 
(O’Neill 2017). When looking at real-world examples, egalitarian liberals point to successful 
welfare-state regimes such as Sweden and Denmark. However, all these regimes protect a 
substantial degree of individual economic freedom alongside supportive welfare systems (Bergh 
2020). Indeed, according to inevitably rough measures of economic freedom, the United States is 
less free than some social democracies (Sumner 2015, 61). So, my argument is a defense neither 
of a rightwing Rawlsianism nor of American capitalism against other forms of capitalism but a 
more general defense of the centrality of commerce. I argue that substantive economic liberty is 
a fundamental, rather than contingent, feature of liberal societies broadly construed albeit, as 
with all liberties, often inadequately and unevenly realized. While this is a theoretical argument, 
it has implications for critiquing emerging authoritarian alternatives to liberal democratic 
regimes, such as in China, that deploy market practices on an expedient basis to pursue growth 
while simultaneously denying both fundamental civil and economic liberties to citizens. 
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The question of basic economic liberties 
Giving priority to a set of basic liberties when establishing fair institutions is a core 
feature of Rawls’ theory of justice. The priority of liberty is key to Rawls distinguishing his 
theory from utilitarian alternatives: 
Justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good 
shared by others. The reasoning which balances the gains and losses of different persons 
as if they were one person is excluded. Therefore in a just society the basic liberties are 
taken for granted and the rights secured by justice are not subject to political 
bargaining… (Rawls 1999, 28) 
In Political Liberalism, Rawls links basic liberties to the development of citizens’ two 
moral powers, the capacity for a sense of justice and conception of the good (Rawls 2005, 294–
95). Basic liberties are supposed to be fully adequate to facilitate and protect a range of practices 
that cultivate these moral powers. These are freedom of thought, liberty of conscience; political 
liberties and freedom of association; liberty and integrity of the person and rights covered under 
the rule of law. However, Rawls excludes economic liberties from such priority: ‘the right to 
own certain kinds of property (e.g., means of production) and freedom of contract as understood 
by the doctrine of laissez-faire are not basic’ (Rawls 1999, 54). This position relates to domestic 
economic arrangements but Rawls was also skeptical of the value of international free trade for 
the pursuit of world peace and stability (Rawls and Van Parijs 2003). 
Tomasi makes a Rawls-inspired substantive moral case for endorsing a set of ‘thick’ 
economic liberties as ‘among the basic rights of liberal citizens’ (Tomasi 2012a, 81). He argues 
that decisions such as starting a business, entering a voluntary labor contract, or saving for 
retirement, can make up important parts of an individual’s life plan. This makes economic 
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liberties a basis for ‘responsible self-authorship’, and thus constitutes a similar justification that 
egalitarian liberals espouse for personal liberties (Tomasi 2012a, 95). Tomasi’s egalitarian critics 
acknowledge the potential for self-authorship in economic decision-making, but only in a narrow 
set of cases. Key points of contention are over the importance of economic liberties to people’s 
life plans, their potential compatibility with the other basic liberties and the compatibility of 
participation in markets with self-respect (Stilz 2014). 
So far, the classical liberal case for basic economic freedoms falls short of the 
requirements of a Rawlsian justification for basic liberties (Platz 2014). On the other hand, the 
liberal egalitarian case for rejecting basic economic liberties has its own weaknesses because it 
seems capable of being applied to a range of civil liberties that are usually taken to be basic 
(Brennan 2019). This leads Flanigan (2018) to suggest that all liberties, no matter how seemingly 
trivial, are basic, potentially deflating attempts to prioritize a specific range of liberties. 
Nevertheless, a more precise focus on the adequate conditions of the development of the moral 
powers suggests a unique role for a relatively ‘thick’ conception of economic liberty. 
Sites of moral cultivation 
What does a person need to cultivate their moral powers? For Rawls, citizens of a liberal 
society need to be rational and reasonable. They must be rational in the sense of being able to 
weigh up conflicting values to produce a conception of the good and develop a coherent life plan 
(Rawls 2005, 51). They must be reasonable in the sense of recognising other people’s interests as 
independently valuable, their own fallibility, and that other people will necessarily come to 
different conclusions about their own conception of the good, and some disagreement about the 
content of justice (Rawls 2005, 53–54). This is what allows a political community to govern 
through public reason and maintain an overlapping consensus based on reasonable pluralism. 
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In terms of sites where these powers are cultivated, Rawls has in mind associations such 
as families, colleges, religious groups and clubs, as well as formal political institutions (Rawls 
1999, 186; 2005, 220). These make up the ‘background culture’ formed from the social practices 
that basic liberties protect. However, there is something missing from Rawls’ framework. The set 
of protected practices are orientated around thick values and interests. The resulting associations 
are predictably going to be segregated along lines of shared comprehensive moral doctrines. As a 
result, individuals are unlikely, through these practices alone, to become adequately familiar with 
the diversity of values in a community. Without such exposure, they will lack assurance of the 
rationality and reasonableness of citizens that engage in different private and civil practices to 
their own. They, in turn, may seem unreasonable to others with different conceptions of the good. 
Yet it is paradigmatic of a well-ordered liberal society that people with a wide range of values 
nevertheless see each other as fellow citizens, worthy of the same respect as themselves and their 
close associates. 
An exception is the public sphere where everyone has a protected right to participate and 
the fair value of all social interests are supposed to be represented. The problem is that absent 
continuous experience of reasonable pluralism, this sphere is likely to take on an alien and 
polarized quality (Cf. Vallier 2019a). Values and attitudes absent from citizens’ experience in 
civil society become sources of existential conflict and mistrust within political and 
administrative processes with no countervailing social background to assure people with 
differences of opinion of their reasonableness and overall shared interests as citizens. People will 
mistrust the sincerity of each other’s arguments advanced in terms of public reason. The range of 
disagreement, even within political parties, may often be too broad for such citizens to recognize 
each other as reasonable. In this context, the political liberties alone are unlikely to be fully 
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adequate for facilitating the cultivation of the moral powers. The solution to this weakness is 
including commercial practices as part of the social background. Participation in productive 
economic activities contributes to making citizens more capable of appropriately weighing the 
claims and interests of fellow citizens against their own. 
Why has this contribution of economic activity been overlooked so far? For Rawls, 
excluding economic liberties from the list of basic liberties follows relatively straightforwardly 
from rejecting utilitarianism as an adequate theory of justice (Cf. Freeman 2011, 25). Under 
neoclassical economic assumptions, which Rawls takes as his point of departure when discussing 
political economy, economic decisions are a technical task of calculating an optimal plan from 
given resources and given ends to produce the best outcomes, a process whose precise advantage 
is that it does not require engagement with moral concerns (Rawls 1999, 248). However, the 
result is that Rawls’ (1999, 240) description of economic activity is curiously agentless and 
static: 
[C]ompetitive prices select the goods to be produced and allocate resources to their 
production in such a manner that there is no way to improve upon either the choice of 
productive methods by firms, or the distribution of goods that arises from the purchases 
of households.  
Economic judgement, on this account, corresponds, at best, to prudence and sound book-
keeping, just following price signals wherever they point (McCloskey 2011). Practicing these 
sorts of judgements could plausibly contribute to people’s capacity for rational calculation and to 
defer gratification, useful for many coherent life plans. Rawls certainly acknowledges the 
expediency of market activity to achieve many justified social ends (1999, 245) and for positive 
steps to make and keep market competitive (2001a, 141). However, on his account, economic 
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activity does not contribute directly to the moral powers; at least, not in a way not equally 
achievable through appropriate upbringing and having to exercise patience as part of any serious 
practice. Although this stylized view of the economy is useful for some purposes of clarification 
in economic theory, Rawls’ reliance on this view rules out conceiving economic liberty to be a 
site of moral development. Drawing on Smith’s understanding of commercial society, I now 
show how this contribution is critical. 
The Smithian role of commerce in moral cultivation 
How does a Smithian account of commercial society depart from Rawls’ understanding 
of economic activity? Smith is well-known for his contribution to economic thought but he was 
principally a moral philosopher (McCloskey 2008). Yet during the 19th and much of the 20th 
centuries, both Smith’s critics and sympathetic interpreters tended to read his moral theory 
independently from, or even in contrast to, his contributions to economics (Tribe 2008). His 
central lesson was taken to be that self-interested people could, through voluntary exchange and 
the division of labor, end up unintentionally benefitting each other. This interpretive lens made 
sense when economic theory was pre-occupied with formalizing the efficiency properties of 
market exchange (Boettke 1997, 20). For example, Samuelson’s description of the classical 
canon suggests that Smith was grasping primitively towards intuitions that could later be 
codified successfully in mathematical models (Samuelson 1978). This misses the side of Smith’s 
account that considers the way that commerce interacts with political processes and wider civil 
society. 
Rather than a conception of humanity as purely rationally self-interested, at the heart of 
Smith’s moral theory is a conception of persons as admittedly partial to their own interests but 
socially oriented and sensitive to the approval of others (Smith 1982 III.2.1). We gain pleasure 
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out of achieving ‘mutual sympathy’ and harmonizing our sentiments with others; we are upset 
when our sentiments are out of alignment with those of our friends and company (Smith 1982 
I.2.1).  Critically, people generally desire not so much to have the approval of others but to be, in 
fact, worthy of their approval (Smith 1982 III.2.7). This is what prompts people’s motivations to 
act morally. Yet our natural sentiments, drawn from our embodied sensations, cannot be shared 
directly between people (Smith 1982 I.1.2). So they are vulnerable to distortions (Smith 1982 
III.4.3). They lead us to overweight our interests, for example, to assume that a trivial personal 
loss is the equivalent of a distant national catastrophe (Smith 1982 III.3.4). The sentimental gaze 
often leads the public to be more pre-occupied with the fate of the rich and famous than the poor 
and disadvantaged (Smith 1982 III.2.7). 
How are these moral sentiments refined? Actions and attitudes based on gross 
misjudgments attract opprobrium, to different degrees and implications, from close friends, 
associates or strangers. For example, Smith suggests that individuals caught up in a low mood 
should seek out wider company that will take them out of themselves and make them 
acknowledge the relative triviality of their concerns (Smith 1982 III.3.39). We often benefit from 
friends chiding us not to be so focused on ourselves. Amongst strangers, we are even more 
encouraged to exercise self-command and distance from our inward emotions. 
Our moral development, therefore, is an increasingly fine-tuned contextual reconciliation 
of our personal judgements with that of the rest of society and, ultimately, humanity (Smith 1982 
III.4.8). Smith uses a metaphorical figure, the impartial spectator, to describe the psychological 
mechanism that individuals, through both instruction and experience, use to become more 
familiar with and guided by more remote, generalizable sentiments and sympathies (Smith 1982 
III.1.6). Awareness of the impartial spectator and its representative, ‘the ideal man within the 
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breast’, has the consequence of prompting us to act appropriately to gain public approval (Smith 
1982 III.4.4; 1982 VI.i.11). It also forms the basis of our internal motivations to behave, in the 
ideal, in a more ‘wise and virtuous’ (Smith 1982 VI.ii.3.3) way even when there is no direct 
reward in terms of public approval. This distinction, between our untutored inclination to self-
love and our capacity to view ourselves from an impartial distance, parallels Rawls’ distinction 
between mere rationality on the one hand, and reasonableness on the other, the capacity to 
recognize our own interests as having ultimately the same weight as our fellow citizens. 
The strength of this public-spirited motivation is sensitive to context and socialization. 
For example, a classic arena where the impartial spectator is easily silenced is in the discussion 
of foreign policy and war, where a nation’s enemies are remote, easily caricatured and 
dehumanized, making it easier for public sentiment to see only one side in a dispute (Smith 1982 
III.3.42). People with more opportunities to cultivate and prompt the intuitions of the impartial 
spectator ultimately conduct themselves in more humane and just ways. Family upbringing and 
schooling, where children first play and converse with people outside their intimate circle, are 
important stages in this moral development (Smith 1982 III.3.20).  
There is a unique contribution from interaction with strangers that commercial exchange 
encourages. On the one hand, we are typically indifferent to the fortune of anyone whose 
interests are unrelated to our own and to whom we are under no particular duty to aid (Smith 
1982 III.3.7). On the other hand, if we find ourselves in a position where the welfare of others is 
specifically dependent on us, then propriety prompts us to act and, especially, to avoid harm 
(Smith 1982 III.3.5). What commercial exchange does is make us temporarily responsible for a 
great many strangers, and us in turn dependent on a multitude of strangers throughout our daily 
lives. With each other’s interests aligned (both our successes and failures will be publicly judged 
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in some form or another), we become habituated to taking the needs of the stranger that we 
generally come across seriously. Commerce also contributes to a sense of fellow feeling among 
those obliged to engage in more intimate forms of cooperation: ‘Colleagues in office, partners in 
trade, call one another brothers; and frequently feel towards one another as if they really were so’ 
(Smith 1982 VI.2.1).  As a result, ‘even the ordinary commerce of the world is capable of 
adjusting our active principles to some degree of propriety’ (Smith 1982 III.3.5). So, Smith sees 
business as part of this wider framework of socialization. It is a midpoint between the deep but 
partial sympathies that friends and family share and the otherwise cold, remoteness of humanity 
in the abstract. As Paganelli (2017, 463) argues, Smith recognizes a dignity and equality in 
mutual exchange relationships often absent in other social interactions: 
Using our imagination to place ourselves in a neutral and distant position from ourselves 
helps us see our egocentrism and humbles us into reconsidering ourselves as just one in a 
multitude. This also help us see others as worthy of respectful interactions: if the other is 
just like me, one in a multitude, I do not need to use violence or to fawn like a puppy to 
get my dinner from him. I can simply persuade him to exchange with me. 
In the Wealth of Nations, Smith aims to explain the role of commerce in material improvement 
rather than morality as such. Nevertheless, stated views complement, rather than contradict, his 
framework in Moral Sentiments. He writes ‘Commerce… ought naturally to be, among nations, 
as among individuals, a bond of union and friendship’ in the context of opposing mercantilist 
trade policies (Smith 1981 IV.iii.C.9). In addition, Smith discusses how the promulgation of 
commercial relations helps equalize people’s political status. He narrates the decline of feudal 
social arrangements where productive surpluses are appropriated by aristocratic lords and then 
distributed through displays of largesse like public feasts to subordinates (Herzog 2014, 710). 
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This is how people are maintained as political dependents. As Smith describes, commerce eats 
away at these arrangements by expanding the availability of luxury goods that rich aristocrats 
can consume. This tempts them into selling off rights to their land in return for mere ‘trinkets and 
baubles’ (Smith 1981 III.iv.15). Thus commerce, without intentional design, undermines 
traditional relations of patronage, giving ordinary workers and traders a substantial degree of 
social independence. 
In another case, Smith examines the malign consequences of England’s poor laws that tie 
impoverished laborers to their home parishes (Smith 1981 I.x.c.45; cf. Wolf 2017). 
Geographically confining those dependent on poor relief was seen as the only way to provide for 
them while discouraging them from exploiting the system and preventing parishes from shifting 
their social obligations on to other districts. Smith instead supported labor mobility, partly for 
familiar reasons of what we now call economic efficiency: mobile laborers can travel to where 
their work is more in demand, raising average wages and productivity. But more significantly for 
Smith, keeping individuals tied to local parishes forcibly reduced them to dependency. This 
disfigured relations with other local inhabitants and thus reduced the basis for mutual respect. 
In these cases, Smith (1981 VI.ix.51) points out the beneficial consequences of ‘the 
obvious and simple system of natural liberty’ over alternatives. In addition, the distributive 
outcomes are achieved through procedures that are consistent with liberty and involve treating 
people as mutual co-operators rather than subordinates and superiors, or dependents and 
benefactors. Smith’s case thus resonates with Rawls’ notion of perfect procedural justice: it 
achieves a morally compelling material outcome and does so through a fair (or, at least, fairer) 
procedure. For neither Rawls nor Smith is the value of the social institution only in the material 
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outcome it produces (although it figures in the overall evaluation). It is what participation in that 
institution represents in terms of moral status and social distinction.  
Smith was under no illusion that economic activity alone could be relied on to cultivate 
the appropriate moral capacities, especially when taken to exclusion of all other activities. He 
feared that monotonous routine labor, in particular, could numb and distort the sentiments of 
factory workers; and that merchants could develop too close sympathies with each other and 
conspire to raise prices (Smith 1981 V.i.f.50; 1981 I.X.C.27). He was thus a supporter of 
subsidizing primary education (Smith 1981 V.i.f.54) and drew attention to the role of 
philosophy, as well as public diversions such as theatre, as additional sources of moral 
refinement and reflection (Smith 1981 V.i.g.15). Nevertheless, he saw commerce as making a 
distinct contribution to expanding sympathy across society. Having recovered this general 
account of how commercial activity facilitates moral improvement, I set out how these activities 
relate specifically to the sense of justice as a moral power. 
A sense of justice 
Both Smith and Rawls begin with the presumption that people are motivated to act in a 
just manner but have neither the natural capacity to know what the content of justice is nor a 
willingness to trust that others will follow it. A key role of social institutions for both theorists is 
to develop in people the capacity for a sense of justice and establish stable expectations that 
others will generally follow its requirements. Their point of division is with respect to the role of 
economic activity which Rawls takes to be irrelevant to moral cultivation. As I have indicated 
above, Rawls’ position on economic activity reflects neoclassical premises that tend to view 
economic decisions as one of calculating where to allocate resources. Under such assumptions, 
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there is little space (or necessity) for humane reflection or judgement about the interests of 
oneself and other people.  
This is where the Smithian account departs from Rawls. Participation in commercial 
decision-making and bargaining in a competitive market (that is, with people who have both the 
right and capacity to walk away from an unsatisfactory agreement) engages and exercises moral 
deliberation. Commercial activity makes people responsible for satisfying the interests of others, 
while also subjecting them to responsive feedback in terms of approval, disapproval, and at some 
margin refusal to cooperate altogether. This makes it a critical mechanism for developing a sense 
of what fairness is within one’s community, and from that a more generalizable sense of justice 
applicable to the social background as a whole. 
Rather than being just a technical task, successful bargaining requires an ability to reflect 
on one’s own personal and business priorities; articulate them in the light of the various offers 
that other people make, and ultimately persuade others of the fairness and reasonableness of 
one’s positions. Negotiation and management require anticipation of the needs and interests of 
others, and creative reflection and deliberation about how they can best be satisfied. Indeed, the 
drawing up of contracts and agreeing policies within and between firms is itself an exercise in 
governance at a limited scale. To be successful in the long run in a competitive market, such 
schemes must be acceptable to all parties involved. Thus a collective understanding of what 
constitutes fair agreement emerges from the trial and error of repeated attempts to establish 
complex private ventures with others. 
Experience with achieving consensus in this setting helps people understand the nature of 
reasonable disagreement when it comes to making compromises in the public sphere. This is 
critical because the allocation of primary goods within a political community cannot itself be 
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achieved through voluntary consent. Otherwise, political associations could be conceptualized as 
a form of private association. This means that citizens, in order to evaluate the justice of a 
political order, need a good practical idea of the social arrangements other citizens would 
publicly endorse. It is through participation in bargaining and contracting in civil society that 
citizens discover how to deliberate effectively about what generally constitutes legitimate 
decision processes and reasonable demands to make of people in their community. Through 
experience of the success and stability of these practices in commerce, acquaintances and 
strangers come to trust each other more generally. This creates a social environment where 
people willingly contribute to the public demands of justice and trust that those reasonable 
demands will also be met by others. Smith provides evidence for this extension of probity in 
private life to just conduct in public life in city and cantonal governments that relied on the self-
assessed tax liabilities of merchants to pay for public goods. In those cases, ‘every one is said to 
declare with the greatest frankness what he is worth, in order to be taxed accordingly’ (Smith 
1981 V.ii.f.11). Although individual transactions will often take place between people in unequal 
economic positions, the process of engagement  encourages citizens to cultivate egalitarian 
norms of reciprocity, trust and respect that can be applied to the public sphere (Schwarze and 
Scott 2019, 77). 
Why thick economic liberties? 
I have argued that participation in commerce can make a unique contribution to the 
development of one’s sense of justice. The standard Rawlsian framework includes rights as 
consumers of goods and choice of occupation as part of the basic liberties. The freedom to 
choose what to buy and where to work from a variety of workplaces under a market socialist 
system could offer precisely the sort of opportunities for cooperative encounters with a diverse 
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set of people. By contrast, my account supports thick liberties to possess, build, buy and sell 
commodities and means of production, to negotiate contacts, and form and enter partnerships. 
These liberties also include the ability for individuals and associations to establish firms with the 
capacity to draw on external investment and establish distinctions between proprietors and 
workers. Must citizens in a liberal society have access to these rights as a matter of fundamental 
priority? 
My case is that the ability to engage in private enterprise enhances the scale and scope of 
cooperation in a way that is ultimately necessary for the development of a widespread sense of 
justice within a political community. This is not a claim that it is impossible for an individual to 
develop a sense of justice when denied those liberties, nor that everyone individually in a society 
must have business experience to develop a sense of justice. Rather it is a claim that the 
additional liberty to engage in business makes a set of basic liberties fully adequate to the extent 
that we can expect the typical citizen to gain a sense of justice appropriate for a liberal society. It 
gives everyone the opportunity at least to observe voluntary cooperation across a community in a 
wide variety of settings and recognize that they are a part of it and benefit from it. 
 In a similar way, citizens do not all have to exercise the full range of political liberties 
that Rawls (1999, 197) argues to be basic, such as running for public office, to develop their 
moral powers adequately. Being immersed in political participation is not a part of many 
reasonable life plans. However, citizens need real opportunities to observe each other freely 
participating in political processes and to know they have equal liberties to enter that site in a 
more engaged way should they choose. Commerce must be included in these protected sites as 
well because it has a characteristic that one does not find in any other sites of moral cultivation in 
civil society: it obliges people with diverse backgrounds to interact and cooperate repeatedly in 
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ways that require the cultivation of mutual trust. This is at the foundation of a society based on 
reasonable pluralism. In the rest of this section, I explain how commercial institutions make that 
distinctive contribution in way that socialist institutions cannot do in isolation and, in addition, 
enable economic cooperation in the public sector to take on the form of voluntary cooperation as 
well. 
The coordination of separate interests 
At the core of commercial society lies the division of labor: the greater specialization of 
individual contributions into ever more complex production processes. Smith uses his famous 
pin factory example to show how breaking a production process down into steps and having 
workers coordinate dramatically increases productivity (Smith 1981 I.i.3). However, Smith’s 
intent was not to show the efficiencies of the factory system as such, but rather to show the 
division of labor in a setting where it could be easily apprehended. To show how much wider the 
scale of cooperation on this same basis is, Smith discusses the example of the production of 
woolen coats: how they are transformed from raw material to finished products through various 
stages across a commercial society (Smith 1981 I.i.11). Whereas a pin factory can operate under 
the management of a single proprietor, the longer supply chains, to which intermediate goods 
like pins are contributors, have no overarching controller. Instead, production is driven by the 
various demands that consumers make in trying to live their lives and attempts by producers to 
fulfill those demands in the best ways they can in pursuit of profit and their other chosen ends. 
Because of the sheer scale of cooperation, most participants are somewhat indifferent to the other 
various contributors and the resulting product. You cannot rely on goodwill shared among all the 
contributors for the whole venture to succeed. As Smith (1981 I.ii.2) famously claims, ‘It is not 
from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but 
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from their regard to their own interest.’ Consider an everyday example of a finished product 
reliant on many intermediate stages that is familiar to scholars. An author might proudly display 
a new publication, but it is unlikely they will feel a close affinity with the bookbinder. The 
binder has probably not read the book and is somewhat indifferent as to its content, although 
they may take satisfaction seeing the physical work in good condition. The publisher cannot feel 
a close affinity to every seller that stocks their books. Some people in this venture find the 
enterprise personally valuable although for slightly different reasons. For example, a publisher 
might be in the trade precisely with the inspiring aim of bringing high-quality literature to the 
public. But a multitude of other contributors, from the copyeditor, the logger, the papermaker, 
the printer, to the delivery driver and the security guard at the distribution center probably do not. 
For them, the work is satisfactory, but it is pay that motivates them. Nevertheless, their 
contribution to the whole enterprise is essential. 
Paid compensation plays an important role in tying complex ventures like these together. 
What payment does is allow people to contribute to a venture that they are not personally 
committed to, and then take the benefits received from their contribution to spend on goods that 
they value as part of achieving their life plans. It allows diverse plans, both economic and 
personal, to coordinate in ways that are otherwise impossible. It is the nexus that joins very 
separate kinds of lives together in ongoing cooperation. People can draw on the value of all the 
various specialized knowledge that others have cultivated when engaging in their own ventures. 
Moreover, people can contribute with confidence that their individual dealings established within 
the chain of cooperation is contributing to the production of goods that others (who they will 
probably never meet) find valuable. They get to link their relatively self-interested bargaining 
with a fair contribution to social welfare. As Smith (1981 I.ii.5) explains: ‘Among men… the 
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most dissimilar geniuses are of use to one another; the different produces of their respective 
talents, by the general disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, being brought… into a common 
stock, where every man may purchase whatever part of the produce of other men's talents he has 
occasion for.’ 
Reconciling risk, liability and responsibility 
A second important feature of these complex chains of cooperation is the ability to 
allocate and diversify risk. This allows for much wider cooperation among people who disagree 
on the underlying expediency of a venture. A book is stocked in a bookstore in the hope, though 
certainly not the strong expectation, that it will find an interested reader who will buy it. 
Inevitably many copies will not find homes. Some will be returned and sold at a discount 
through alternative supply chains. Many will be pulped and turned into other paper goods.  Yet 
few of the people involved in bringing the book to market can share in the financial risk. They 
require payment regardless of the actual realized gains of cooperation. Although authors might 
be willing to risk their time writing in aid of the uncertain venture of a new book, they are rarely 
willing or able to risk their own money on a publication run and advertising. The bookstores and 
distributors will not stock the book without a guarantee of a refund from the publisher. So it is 
usually going to be a publisher, and shareholders in the case of large publishers, who are willing 
to absorb the financial risk of a new publication. Through specializing in owning rights to 
publish a range of books, the publishing firm can reduce their overall risk for each publication 
that fails. Ultimately, it allows them to market a broad range of books and still survive because 
only a few need to be profitable. Private investment helps to dramatically expand the scope of 
mutual beneficial cooperation than would otherwise be available. 
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Inevitably, most goods in complex supply chains are produced without a specific 
consumer in mind. Yet, if people were unwilling or unable to risk personal investment in the 
enterprise, then this form of cooperation would be impossible at this scale. It is not just the 
finding of a consumer that presents risk and uncertainty. It is the successful implementation of 
any step of production. When the viability of a supply chain is at stake, an individual worker 
cannot be held jointly liable for a failure in their associated enterprise that may be due to 
equipment failure, accident or someone else’s mistake, even if that failure vitiates their personal 
contribution. It is this division of responsibility and risk that thick economic liberties permit 
because it allows individuals to develop, own, sell and invest in commodities and means of 
production that they are personally confident that they can use to contribute to other people’s 
productive endeavors. If they turn out to be wrong, they absorb the cost rather than the other 
parties. This is what expands the scope of possible voluntary agreements. It is through ownership 
and investment that people take on liabilities for the successes and failures of the activities of 
others. 
These ‘thick’ economic liberties expand possible forms of cooperation and interaction 
that contribute to the development a sense of justice. A feature of reasonable pluralism is that 
people will have different beliefs about what is a worthwhile enterprise, both practically in terms 
of fulfilling consumer desires and what they find interesting or valuable for pursuing their own 
personal commitments. They will have diverse beliefs about what sort of ventures are worth 
risking their own time and resources. The ability to compensate people as traders, workers or 
contractors, rather than joint owners in an enterprise, allows people to set aside these sources of 
disagreement. It allows the party more personally committed and identified with the venture to 
take on additional risk and responsibility. In other words, they are willing to agree on the relative 
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distribution of costs, benefits and risks despite disagreement about the ultimate value of the 
shared enterprise. This experience of bargaining in the shadow of both practical and value 
disagreement lies at the core of developing a sense of justice for coping with reasonable 
disagreement in public settings. 
In making these claims, it is not my intention to idealize the realm of commercial 
enterprise established through thick economic liberties. The relationships and experiences of 
cooperation only work as I have described if people approach these interactions with reasonable 
ethical constraints and if markets are competitive (Otteson 2019). Without well-functioning labor 
markets bolstered by an underlying social insurance scheme, people’s experience of market 
society will be one of precarity and disempowerment (Baderin and Barnes 2018). 
Competitiveness between firms is important because it is what raises workers to the same status 
as employers – making them each need each other reciprocally. These conditions create the 
choice environment where mutually beneficial agreements on the small-scale tend to lead to 
social benefits at the societal level.  
One could give a parallel account of how moral powers are cultivated (along different 
dimensions) in sites likes families, churches, sports clubs and the democratic political process 
while still recognizing that abuse and exploitation can take place in these sites as well in non-
ideal settings. In non-ideal settings, for example, where people do not consistently comply with 
legitimate public rules, it is not possible for a society to aim to respect all basic liberties, and so 
economic liberty could not be prioritized in the way that I am proposing for more congenial 
scenarios here. 
Why not a liberal or market socialism? 
An important objection is that there are substitutes to private enterprise that can play the 
role of facilitating mutual economic cooperation across society. Scholars offer several alternative 
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regimes associated with Rawlsian principles, including market socialism, workplace democracy 
and worker cooperatives (Hsieh 2005; Carens 1981; Roemer 1994; Cohen and Rogers 1994).  
To answer this objection, it is necessary to recognize where the controversy lies between 
commercial liberty and socialist alternatives. Commercial liberalism requires only that private 
businesses be permitted, not that they should be pervasive or advantaged over other kinds of 
enterprise voluntarily constituted through people utilizing their basic liberties. For example, 
Switzerland is a liberal democratic society with a competitive market economy. Nevertheless, its 
largest retailer, Migros, is a consumer cooperative. A parallel example is the large employee-
owned John Lewis Partnership in the liberal democratic United Kingdom (Lehmann 2014). Thus 
cooperatives and worker-owned firms are part of commercial societies and make an essential 
contribution to the chains of cooperation I have described in the previous section. The 
opportunity for people to work as freelancers, sole proprietors or co-owners of firms, rather than 
employees, is part of a commercial order. By contrast, socialist alternatives to commercial orders 
typically involve curtailing or prohibiting private enterprise and setting constraints on internal 
governance rules for firms rather than allowing them to emerge through private agreement. 
With that in mind, the question is not one of picking between worker ownership and 
private ownership (as commercial societies include both), but rather what the consequences 
would be of prohibiting or substantially restricting the scope of private enterprise where it would 
otherwise emerge through contractual bargaining. On my account, it would substantially reduce 
the scope of voluntary cooperation in ways that would (1) reduce the diversity of interactions 
between cooperating participants and (2) make the overall market order less competitive because 
successful enterprises will no longer scale-up effectively to meet consumer demands and offer 
employment opportunities within the scheme of economic cooperation. 
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Bringing in new workers to a cooperative or democratic workplace means accepting them 
as members or joint owners. They gain a share of control over the means of production that has 
been established and cultivated by the current membership based on shared risk and commitment 
to the venture. To preserve the firm in a form recognizable to its original members, they will 
have to ensure that new members have similar interests and attitudes to risk and responsibility. 
Otherwise, they may find the organization’s business plan dramatically altered in a way that the 
original members would not have agreed to commit part of their lives if this had been understood 
at outset. This is a particularly fraught issue when dealing with cooperation across the 
generations. People will have different risk attitudes at different points in their lives and also 
different desires about how long to stay with a particular enterprise. Absent capital markets, the 
ability of owners to trade out of membership will be limited so they cannot voluntarily cede 
control of the organization to new owners in return for compensation.  Without the ability for the 
current membership to exit through an exchange of shares in the organization, the key test of any 
new member of a cooperative enterprise will be whether they have similar preferences and 
talents to the current membership. The possibilities of close cooperation between people who 
have different values and interests will be dramatically reduced. 
The other weakness is that without access to profit-seeking investors with exchangeable 
claims on firm equity, worker-owned firms tend to have much more limited incentive and 
capacity to grow when successful. Because scaling involves sharing profits on an equivalent 
basis with new entrants to the enterprise, the individual members will not personally benefit from 
the investment of scaling up the organization (Porter and Scully 1987). Although this is not a 
problem within a free commercial order where worker-owned firms adjust to the presence of 
commercial alternatives, if firms were exclusively constituted this way, it would mean that many 
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opportunities to expand to meet consumers demands would be foregone, and employment 
opportunities in productive parts of the economy would be restricted. Many people would be 
excluded from productive participation in the economy because they are unable to a match to an 
existing firm that fits their attitude and profile. The connection between personal benefit and 
aggregate social benefits will have been attenuated. One solution would be to impute some 
inherent desire to pursue equality of opportunity as part of the motivation for these worker-
owners. But reliance on that sort of goodwill throughout an economy bears a closer resemblance 
to the patron-client relationships that predominate in pre-commercial orders rather than the kind 
of mutual exchange among equals that Smith affirms. 
The areas of activity where cooperative partnerships tend to be established and persist in 
practice illustrate their limits in theory. Cooperatives in commercial orders classically include 
professional partnerships, such as law firms, where experienced workers contribute to common 
resources and operate under a single brand but work independently when dealing with clients. 
They can operate successfully in partnership because they each have homogenous interests as 
members of the same profession and are often at roughly the same career stage. Thus they are 
each willing to take on roughly the same level of risk, responsibility and shared costs and 
benefits of working in the same firm. They can operate as equals concerning themselves although 
they take great care when considering taking on a new partner. Another area is in retail firms, 
like supermarket chains, that have relatively simple scalable practices and routines, and do not 
require as many specialized workers or long-term capital investment (even then, there is often a 
reliance on internal federal structures to prevent capital being redistributed from one site to 
another). For other kinds of goods and services, especially innovative or capital-intensive firms, 
where risks and responsibilities cannot be shared among equal members, the capacity to raise 
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private investment is critical. 
The practical problem of getting people to cooperate across society without private 
enterprise is plausibly surmountable either through setting public rules that control membership 
entry or through having exclusively state-owned enterprises. The state could require successful 
firms to expand their scale and membership against the wishes of current members. This solution 
does not, however, substitute for what voluntary contracting and bargaining offers for developing 
a sense of justice. The key decisions about what constitutes a reasonable policy, as opposed to 
the administrative implementation of a given policy, are pre-empted by the political process. This 
denies most citizens the opportunity to make practical decisions that govern who they will deal 
with and how in ways that systematically produces aggregate social benefits. Yet this is precisely 
the experience citizens need for developing a sense of justice. 
Unions and the public sector 
What role is there for unions and public sector organization in a commercial order? These 
might appear to be alternative sites where a sense of justice could be cultivated. My answer 
parallels the role described above for cooperatives. They play a critical role in the ecology of 
commerce but cannot function as a complete replacement for private enterprise. Unions are an 
example of workers exercising their liberties of freedom of association and their thick economic 
liberties to create an organization that collectively bargains on their behalf. Workers’ rights to 
self-organize through voluntary contracting are part of the basic economic liberties, and any 
commercial societies that lack those rights are unjust and incomplete. Within the broader scheme 
of cooperation, unions are essentially worker-owned firms that sell labor services to other firms. 
Just as entrepreneurs make use of economies of scale and the division of labor when forming 
firms, so can workers do the same through combination. Unions are, in addition, an important 
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check against the private power that unrestrained employees can exert over workers (cf. 
Anderson 2019). Nevertheless, on my account, in order to ensure the persistence of the chains of 
cooperation that extend across society (as opposed to relations within industries or firms), unions 
and their members must contract with the various other kinds of firms that exist. 
Similarly, we can observe many of the values underlying mutual cooperation in the 
activities of public organizations such as hospitals and schools. Thus, it may appear that an 
exclusively public-sector economy could function as effectively as a commercial order. On my 
account, the existence of a commercial order with which these organizations interact is critical 
for ensuring that they contribute to mutual cooperation. Public institutions make use of 
intermediate goods produced in the rest of the economy (including textbooks, computer 
equipment, medical devices and pharmaceuticals). Their ability to contribute to the social good is 
assured by their ability to draw on the resources and knowledge of the whole community which 
can only be done through voluntary bargaining when there is a substantial space for private 
markets. The existence of a diverse commercial society means that individuals are not reliant on 
a single employer (the state) for work. This disciplines public organizations so that they must 
offer at least competitive market wages and conditions. Unless effectively constrained by the 
same rules that apply to private firms, public enterprises can harm the communities they are 
meant to serve (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). So, commercial society helps to ensure that mutually 
beneficial arrangements are predominant in the public sector as well. 
This challenges egalitarian liberal perspectives that associate economic justice with 
socialist economic institutions. A core feature of the Rawlsian enterprise is that society is a 
cooperative venture for mutual advantage. On my account, socialist institutions can bring about 
mutual benefits voluntarily at a small-scale (the equivalent of a village commune). However, 
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they cannot ensure the benefits are to the interests of a whole political community; at least not 
without coercively administering people and resources in a way that will deny people experience 
of personally realizing mutual gains from negotiation and bargaining. To reconcile the meeting of 
social needs with procedural equality requires the addition of a market system for goods and 
services and competition between firms that have ability to develop their internal governance 
arrangements through voluntary contracting. While procedural equality is a necessary, not 
sufficient, condition for justice as a fairness, ultimately, the Smithian defense of commerce is 
supportive of social equality. 
Regulating basic liberties 
Attempts like mine to integrate basic economic liberties into a Rawlsian framework face 
the objection that they are ultimately offering an alternative justification for policies popular 
amongst 19th-century liberals but opposed to the principles of 20th and 21st-century liberalism. 
Such a case is vulnerable to the criticism that there never was a ‘natural’ set of economic 
arrangements. All arrangements are the result of conflicts and compromises in each society. 
What sort of institutions are necessary to protect economic liberty has been subject to change 
throughout modern history. There is no paradigm to look back to, and if one does look back, one 
will see many illiberal processes and outcomes. 
What my account requires, therefore, is a way of specifying a range of possible economic 
institutions compatible with treating economic liberty as basic. This is essential because, of 
course, we cannot expect economic liberties alone to produce a fair distribution of social 
resources. So space must be permitted for other institutions supporting the distribution of 
primary goods to play a role, including a welfare state potentially at least as expansive as that 
found in contemporary social democracies, or more radically a property-owning democracy 
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(Platz 2016; Vallier 2015; 2019b). Highlighting the limited implications that Rawls draws from 
affirming basic liberties, in general, helps with this: 
In understanding the priority of the basic liberties we must distinguish between 
their restriction and their regulation. The priority of these liberties is not infringed when 
they are merely regulated, as they must be, in order to be combined into one scheme as 
well as adapted to certain social conditions necessary for their enduring exercise. So 
long as what I shall call “the central range of application” of the basic liberties is 
provided for, the principles of justice are fulfilled (Rawls 2005, 295–96). 
I suggest that protecting basic liberties corresponds to three procedural conditions that 
limit the way that basic liberties can be regulated. One condition refers to substantive aims of 
regulation, one to their priority, one to the form: 
1. The principal aim of the regulation cannot be to reduce the ability of 
people to exercise a basic liberty, and the supposed aim cannot be merely speculative. 
2. The public policy aim of the regulation must be to improve the exercise of 
the basic liberty regulated or another basic liberty (cf. Freiman and Thrasher 2019). 
3. Any regulation of the exercise of a basic liberty must be implemented in a 
non-arbitrary way that applies to all on the basis of formal equality. 
What this implies with respect to economic liberties is that there should be a substantial 
private economic sphere and that its regulation should be made on the principle of equality 
before the law. Thus a large range of institutional arrangements is compatible with protecting 
basic economic liberties, including social democracies with large public sectors and welfare-
states (cf. Layman 2015). My account places priority on establishing a competitive market (cf. 
Rawls 2001b, 67). This may require regulations such as compulsory workmen’s compensation, 
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health and safety rules, vehicle insurance and licensing, consumer product labelling and financial 
disclosure, as well as antitrust enforcement to prevent private monopolies from emerging (a 
contemporary challenge posed by the new technology giants). As with other basic liberties, 
exactly how economic liberties are expressed and protected will depend on historical and cultural 
factors. Any such regulations cannot aim to restrict reasonable options that workers may 
voluntarily choose, and they must still leave significant opportunity for individuals and groups in 
civil society to negotiate their own terms of cooperation. Moreover, their substitution in the form 
of alternatives that reject individual economic liberties is ruled out. 
Applying basic economic liberties 
My argument is a contribution to the Rawlsian project of reconciling political philosophy 
with public understandings and underpinnings of liberal society, as well as empirical 
observations of the relationship between economic and political liberty (Lawson and Clark 
2010). Economic liberty is one necessary but emphatically insufficient condition for a stable 
liberal society, which means that it cannot be granted priority above other basic liberties. So my 
account is not programmatic and has to be interpreted against the specific challenges of any 
given regime and community. Nevertheless, it is illustrative to ask what the implications my 
approach have for some practical issues over which classical and egalitarian liberals sometimes 
clash. 
My approach does not rule out minimum wage laws because they can be framed in 
general terms. Instead, it places a public duty on those considering them to scrutinize the effect 
of regulation on the economic liberties of those participating in low-wage markets, especially 
those at risk of losing working hours or job opportunities if the wage is set too high. This 
calculus cannot be purely utilitarian. A minimum wage that successfully raises wages but at the 
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cost of excluding even a small minority from employment would likely be unjust because of the 
particular limitation that exclusion from economic life has on a person’s moral powers. The 
minimum wage cannot have a purely distributive intent behind it. It must be intended to remedy 
a plausible asymmetry of bargaining or information that prevents the low-wage market from 
working effectively. Alternative policies like employee and family tax credits, which do not 
directly interfere with freedom of contract and are usually more effective at achieving their stated 
distributive aims, may prove to be more conducive to ensuring everyone has access to their 
essential primary goods (Meyer and Wu 2018). Regulation and taxation of capital is similarly 
compatible with basic economic liberties when aiming to bring about distributive justice, to 
make markets transparent and competitive, as well as for collecting state revenue. However, 
regulations cannot be implemented with the simple intent of discouraging private ownership of 
capital or reducing investment activity as such. 
Outside these issues of controversy, however, the protection of basic economic liberties 
are as likely to unite as to divide classical and egalitarian liberals on policy. Both, for example, 
may end up opposing policies such as occupational licensing or discriminatory zoning laws 
which are usually intended to reduce competition and have the effect of increasing living 
expenses for the disadvantaged (Lindsey and Teles 2017). A political process that permits 
arbitrary economic regulation can be captured by the powerful, undermining minority protections 
and generating social conflict (Berggren and Nilsson 2016). Appropriately specified economic 
liberties can protect the disadvantaged just as civil libertarian constraints on the regulation of 
civil society are generally to the advantage of the marginalized. 
Conclusion 
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I argue for extending Rawlsian basic liberties to include a ‘thick’ set of economic 
liberties. It is based on the classical Smithian account of commerce as offering a site of moral 
improvement, especially in terms of trust and tolerance. This makes a necessary and unique 
contribution to citizens’ reasonableness and a sense of justice appropriate for a liberal 
community. The contribution of economic liberty to experience of cooperation means that 
leaving it unprotected or giving it unequal protection would be unjust. However, affirming 
economic liberty as basic does not imply adherence to laissez-faire capitalism. Economic liberty 
is subject to weighting against other basic liberties, and must be subject to regulation to make it 
equally extensive to all, with the result that a range of institutions that value and prioritize 
economic liberty in different ways can nevertheless adequately respect it. Economic liberty 
cannot, however, be deliberately diminished to achieve some other social good or arbitrarily 
restricted. 
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